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Justice as Fairness: A Commentary on
Rawls's New Theory of Justice
Gilbert Merritt*
I. INTRODUCTION
A Theory of Justice,' John Rawls's new book on social and legal
philosophy, appears likely to become a monument of systematic thought
comparable to Locke's Second Treatise of Government and Mill's
Utilitarianism. It provides answers systematically to the most difficult
questions of our time and promises to shape the thought and action of
men for many years. Daniel Bell, a noted social scientist, has said that
in Rawls "we can observe the development of a political philosophy
which will go far to shape the last part of the 20th Century, as the
doctrines of Locke and Smith molded the 19th." ' 2 Charles Fried, the
noted legal philosopher, recently wrote:
This book in my view is the most important work in moral and social philoso-
phy published since World War II. It is magisterial in its purpose: to propound a
complete and fully elaborated theory of justice and to locate it within the context
of a well developed general theory of the right and the good as well as of ethical
epistemology and method. . . .[I]t is a completely original work. It is an original
work because it takes into account modern developments in all branches of philoso-
phy, and in relevant areas of logic, mathematics, psychology and economics.3
This Review, intended to introduce Rawls's thought to the broad
legal community, will describe the structure of A Theory of Justice,
emphasize its fundamental concepts, and indicate the impact that its
application to our legal system may have.
II. GENERAL ORDER OF DISCUSSION OF RAWLSIAN SYSTEM
Many moral philosophers and social scientists follow a two-step
line of argument in formulating theories of how society should assign
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fundamental rights and duties and distribute the benefits of work and
cooperation. They identify a single end or goal, such as pleasure, happi-
ness, or the greater glory of God, toward which individual morality is
directed. Then, arguing that justice is the maximization of this end for
society generally, they construct a theory of justice by working out the
rights, duties, principles, and rules that are necessary to extend the
individual good to society. Utilitarianism, which has dominated the
thinking of intellectuals and guided the action of officials for almost a
century, is such a teleological philosophy. Happiness or satisfaction is
its dominant individual good and, as Rawls says, its "main idea is that
society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions
are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction
summed over all the individuals belonging to it."4
Under utilitarian principles, maximizing satisfaction permits ine-
qualities in theory that individuals intuitively find unacceptable in prac-
tice and may be used to justify "the violation of the liberty of a few...
by the greater good shared by many."' 5 Most arguments justifying arbi-
trary inequalities and violations of liberties follow the utilitarian forms
of maximizing satisfaction to provide the greatest net balance. Accord-
ing to Rawls, however, this is a fundamental flaw resulting from "ex-
tending to society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make
this extension work, conflating all persons into one through the imagina-
tive acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator. Utilitarianism does not
take seriously the distinction between persons."'
Rawls's system avoids this problem in two ways. The good does not
have a single or dominant end, but rather he defines it as multiple or
plural with a complex structure capable of rational analysis. Moreover,
he asserts that a theory of justice is not dependent on a definition of
individual good and that in constructing a system of justice a theory of
the good does not have to precede a theory of the right.7
4. Rwts, supra note I, § 5, at 22.
5. Id. at 26.
6. Id. at 27. Suppose a case where a white child is raped by a black youth in a community
where racial tension is high and prosecution of the guilty youth would create a very substantial
risk of a race riot. If the police chief and district attorney are the only ones who know of the black
youth's guilt and can keep it secret, they might conclude that community welfare requires pinning
the crime on an old white derelict who needs institutional care anyway. Utilitarianism would be
compatible with and willing to consider this course of conduct, which as a matter of moral
judgment we find unacceptable.
7. "[T]he structure of teleological doctrines is radically misconceived: from the start they
relate the right and the good in the wrong way. We should not attempt to give form to our life by
first looking to the good independently defined. It is not our aims that primarily reveal our nature
but rather the principles that we acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which
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In describing the general direction of this philosophy, I will follow
Rawls's "reverse" order, outlining first the main principles of justice
under his system and then the relationship between these and the indi-
vidual good.'
III. MAIN PRINCIPLES OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE
Rawls's system is particularly appealing to the legal mind. Striving
to be fully deductive, geometrically deriving subsidiary principles from
main principles and assumptions, it nevertheless follows patterns of
common-law reasoning by looking for the rational structure underlying
our intuitions-the unexpressed consistencies and distinctions in moral
situations. It is a reflective process, checking the results of deductive
reasoning against judgments arising from concrete situations and seek-
ing to define acceptable points of equilibrium.
Rawls's theory begins in the social contract tradition. He holds that
we are most likely to arrive at just, obligatory, and stable principles for
ordering the basic structure of society if the process is viewed as an
effort to reach agreement by the persons affected. In this way each
person is given an equal share in formulating principles, and by accept-
ing the benefits of the agreement, each assumes a duty to accept its
obligations. This notion of social contract-the consent of the gov-
erned-appears explicitly in the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble to the Constitution. I"
these aims are to be formed and the manner in which they are to be pursued. For the self is prior
to the ends which are affirmed by it; even a dominant end must be chosen from among numerous
possibilities. . . .We should therefore reverse the relation between the right and the good pro-
posed by teleological doctrines and view the right as prior. The moral theory is then developed by
working in the opposite direction." Id. § 84, at 560 (emphasis added).
8. Rawls's work is divided into 3 parts: in the first, he explains the main principles of his
system; in the second, he describes the institutions that satisfy the main principles and are necessary
in order for the basic structure of society to be just; and in the third, he relates the main principles
and institutions to this theory of the individual good. In turn each of these 3 parts is divided into 3
chapters:
PART ONE. THEORY PART Two. INSTITUTIONS
I. Justice As Fairness I. Equal Liberty
II. The Principles of Justice II. Distributive Shares
III. The Original Position III. Duty and Obligation
PART THREE. ENDS
I. Goodness as Rationality
II. The Sense of Justice
III. The Good of Justice
9. "That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed .... "




A. The Original Position
Rawls next formulates the hypothetical set of conditions and proce-
dures that govern the way agreement should be reached. These condi-
tions define the "original position" from which the participants bargain.
In the original position, each person retains his common sense, self-
interest, and knowledge of each of the general facts about human nature
and society. But certain evidence is not admissible and may not be
considered by the participants. No one knows or may consider whether
he is rich or poor, black or white, male or female, strong or weak, sick
or well, or the other particular facts and characteristics of his own
circumstances.
Thus, Rawls imposes the principle of equality on the hypothetical
deliberations of the original position on the ground that in formulating
principles of a just society, inherited or acquired characteristics such as
wealth, intelligence, race and health are morally irrelevant and therefore
not admissible in evidence. We should emphasize that the original posi-
tion is a figurative or metaphorical situation, and these rules of evidence
are artificial. Yet they seek to reflect common sense. They are principles
of neutrality and impartiality that we would try to employ in making
up the rules of a game or a trial that we wanted to be fair. They also
accord with deeply held moral beliefs in mutual respect and dignity, the
rationality of man, his capacity to choose and adhere to moral princi-
ples, and the unique potentialities of individuals. They are derived from
traditional Christian ethics and enlightenment philosophy and express
the same sense of fundamental moral worth expressed by Locke and
Kant and adopted by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence in
the phrase, "all men are created equal."" It is from this fair set of
procedures imposed on the deliberations of the original position that
Rawls draws the title he gives his entire theory-"justice as fairness."
B. The Principles
From the conditions of fairness that define the original position,
Rawlsian justice draws its two main principles of order for the basic
structure of society and a third set of principles describing individual
duties and obligations. Rawls calls the two fundamental rules the princi-
ple of equal liberty and the principle of distributive justice:
11. The relationship between Rawls's original position and Jefferson's view is even more
clear from the first draft of this part of the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths
to be sacred and undeniable; that all men are created equal and independent, that from that equal
creation, they derive rights inherent and inalienable."
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First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions
and offices opened to all."2
1. Equal Liberty.-The first principle, which encompasses both
personal and political liberty, defines a workable political conception
generally followed in our constitutional and legal system. From this
principle Rawls formulates by a process of rational analysis a variety
of moral principles of more specific application: freedom of conscience,
thought, speech, assembly, and association; toleration; liberty of the
person; political rights, including those associated with equal participa-
tion in the political process and fair opportunity for their exercise;
principles of priority that control conflicts among liberties; and the rule
of law, including a discussion of due process, penal sanctions, and the
relation of liberty to the public nature of rules and their clarity.'3
In Rawls's moral framework, this first principle of equal liberty has
priority over the second principle of distributive justice. Accordingly,
equal liberty may not be decreased, departed from, or traded-off in
order to gain greater social and economic advantages. 4 Neither, for
example, may freedom of speech or due process be exchanged for the
advantages of economic growth or efficiency that a more regimented
society might provide; nor may equal liberty be sacrificed to attain
greater economic equality.
15
2. Distributive Justice.-Although not well established in our so-
ciety, the principle that social and economic inequalities are justified
only when advantageous to everyone, particularly to the least favored
12. RAWLS, supra note I, § I1, at 60-61.
13. Rawls's discussion of enhancing the worth of political liberty in relation to election
financing demonstrates a specific application of the first principle of his moral system.
Compensating steps must, then, be taken to preserve the fair value for all of the equal political
liberties. A variety of devices can be used. . . . In addition political parties are to be made
independent from private economic interests by alloting them sufficient tax revenues to play
their part in the constitutional scheme. . . . What is necessary is that political parties be
autonomous with respect to private demands, that is, demands not expressed in the public
forum and argued for openly by reference to a conception of the public good. If society does
not bear the costs of organization, and party funds need to be solicited from the more
advantaged social and economic interests, the pleadings of these groups are bound to receive
excessive attention. And this is all the more likely when the less favored members of society,
having been effectively prevented by their lack of means from exercising their fair degree of
influence, withdraw into apathy and resentment.
Id. § 36, at 225-26.
14. This is true at least in a relatively affluent society; in a poor country there may be some
trading in order to provide conditions which make the enjoyment of liberty meaningful.
15. RAWLS, supra note I, § 46.
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class, is gaining recognition. It is not a socialist or Marxist view, for
Rawls's system recognizes private ownership of the means of produc-
tion, property, and wealth, although it remains specifically neutral on
whether such ownership should or should not be in private hands. Al-
though the principle has economic consequences, it is not a part of
economic theory but rather a moral principle derived from the principle
of equality and the conditions of fairness which define the original posi-
tion.
Rawls's view of distributive justice is based on two underlying prin-
ciples: the "difference principle"-the concept that an equal distribution
of social goods is preferable unless an unequal distribution will benefit
both persons-and equality of opportunity-the principle that everyone
similarly motivated and endowed should have roughly equal prospects
of culture and achievement. Equal opportunity is necessary as a correc-
tive measure from one generation to the next, for the difference princi-
ple, which permits the use of social incentives in the form of income,
inheritance, and authority differences, otherwise might give some mem-
bers of each generation too great an advantage from the beginning. The
principle of equality of opportunity includes rules that prevent excessive
accumulations of wealth and provide equal opportunities of education
for all.
Rawls's conception of justice rejects the idea that wealth and life's
other tangible benefits should be distributed on the basis of who "de-
serves" them. In a moral sense, no one deserves the arbitrary advan-
tages of inherited wealth or talents that result from the natural lottery
of intelligence, energy, and health. The ordinary criterion of deserv-
ing-the willingness to make an effort-itself depends upon happy fam-
ily and social circumstances. 6 Furthermore, income and wealth based
on one's "contribution" are determined primarily by laws of supply and
demand, not moral worth.17 Although some theorists have proposed the
elimination of distinctions of wealth and power based on merit or
greater natural capacity, Rawls argues that
. . . the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distri-
bution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this
distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favored by nature,
whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve
the situation of those who have lost out."8
From these principles of distributive justice, Rawls formulates a
16. Id. § 12, at 74.
17. Id. § 48, at 311-12.
18. Id. § 17, at 101.
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variety of moral principles of more specific application: the proper sav-
ings rate over time; the level at which a social income minimum should
be set; and the proportion of total social resources that should be de-
voted to public goods. 9 In order to establish the background institutions
for a just basic structure, Rawls suggests that the government should
be divided into four branches charged with preserving certain social and
economic conditions: (1) the "allocation" branch, whose objectives are
to effect a competitive price system relatively free of unreasonable accu-
mulations of market power and to administer a system of incentive taxes
and subsidies designed to correct the occasional but inevitable failures
of the market to allocate certain resources properly; (2) the "stabiliza-
tion" branch, whose purpose is to maintain full employment; (3) the
"transfer" branch, which must make the adjustments necessary to
maintain the social income minimum, the level necessary to support the
needs and standard of life of the disadvantaged; and (4) the "distribu-
tion" branch, responsible for raising necessary revenues and encourag-
ing the wide disbursal of property, correcting deviations in the distribu-
tion of wealth, and preventing concentrations of power detrimental to
the fair value of political liberty and equality of opportunity." This
latter task would be accomplished through the system of taxation and
through adjustments in property rights.
3. Individual Duties and Obligations.-The principles of equal
liberty and distributive justice governing the basic structure of society
and subordinate principles to be derived from them give rise to a multi-
tude of moral requirements for individuals. Although a comprehensive
discussion of these requirements would relate the Rawlsian system to
the whole catalogue of legal standards, rules, rights, and duties that
constitute the body of our law, Rawls demonstrates this relationship
with a few fundamental distinctions.
He first distinguishes between natural moral duties and moral
obligations. Natural duties apply unconditionally to individuals regard-
less of their voluntary acts or relationship to a particular institution or
group. Examples include the duty of mutual respect, the duty to avoid
causing unnecessary suffering, and the duty to support and further just
institutions. An obligation, on the other hand, arises from what Rawls
calls the "principle of fairness," which provides that when a group of
people join in a cooperative venture according to established rules, those
who restrict their liberty in order to benefit all, may rightfully expect
19. Public goods include such items as defense, health services, and social insurance.
20. RAWLS, supra note I, § 43.
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others who benefit from the venture similarly to restrict their freedom.21
While natural duties and obligations overlap, obligations are based on
the notion that an individual should not gain from the cooperative effort
of others without contributing his fair share. This is a principle of reci-
procity or mutual benefit. This principle of reciprocity influences a large
part of the structure of cooperation and trust in society. "It is now
equally evident that, having trust and confidence in one another, men
can use their public acceptance of these principles enormously to extend
the scope and value of mutually advantageous schemes of coopera-
tion.12 Many doctrines and standards of contracts, torts, and restitu-
tion, for example, derive from this principle.
2 3
Rawls does not discuss at length the principle of mutual benefit or
reciprocity of obligation, or deduce and elaborate from it either concrete
applications or principles and rules of more intermediate levels of ab-
straction. He does, however, go through this process for one of the
natural duties: the connection between the duty to support just institu-
tions and civil disobedience. Rawls discusses the definition and role of
civil disobedience and conscientious refusal, the duty to comply with
unjust laws, and the status of majority rule. He demonstrates that pro-
perly limited civil disobedience is occasionally justified in a relatively
just society, but only to protest violations of the principles of equal
liberty and equality of opportunity-and not to protest unjust tax laws
or other violations of the difference principle. He shows how the con-
cepts of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal, when properly
understood and acted upon, are a force for stability in society. Rawls
articulates the philosophical bases present in many of the writings of
Jefferson and Paine on civil disobedience and underlying many early
state constitutional provisions on civil disobedience and non-
resistance.24
4. Summary of Rawls's Main Principles ofJustice.-Concluding
his discussion of the foundations of his theory of justice, Rawls summa-
rizes and puts his two main principles in final form. The first states that
each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive system of
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. The
second asserts that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged
21. Id. § 18, at 111-12.
22. Id. § 52, at 347-48.
23. For a discussion of the implications of the principle of reciprocity see notes 42-55 infra
and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. Art. 1, § 2 (adopted in 1796): "That government being insti-
tuted for the common benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppres-
sion is absurd, slavish and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind."
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so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,
which is consistent with the just savings principle, and attached to off-
ices and positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportun-
ity. Rawls then restates the two priority rules derived from the princi-
ples. The first, the Priority of Liberty, requires that the principles of
justice be ranked in lexical order and that, accordingly, liberty may be
restricted only for liberty's sake. Under this ordering, a less extensive
liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all, and a
less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those possessing the lesser
liberty. The second rule, the Priority of Justice over Efficiency and
Welfare, dictates that the second principle of justice stands lexically
prior to both the principle of efficiency and that of maximizing the sum
of advantages. Additionally, fair opportunity takes priority over the
difference principle. Under this rule, an inequality of opportunity must
enhance the opportunities of those given less opportunity, and an exces-
sive rate of savings must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing
this hardship. Finally, Rawls submits that "[a]ll primary social
goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of
self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution
of these goods is advantageous to the least favored. 12
IV. RELATION OF MAIN PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE TO INDIVIDUAL GOOD
Having presented the main principles of justice, the institutions
they require, and the duties and obligations they impose on individuals,
Rawls turns, finally, to the question whether justice as fairness is a
feasible conception. Is it consistent with the great variety of wants and
aims that men have? Is our nature such that these principles can be
carried through? Do these principles lead to a stable society, and are
they congruent with the way men see their own good? Rawls's principles
of justice are provisional: they are put forward with the knowledge that
they are valid only if an account of the individual good shows that the
life goals and wants of individuals will flourish under these principles.
A. Nature of the Individual Good
Rawls views the individual good as a multiple and complex set of
activities and ends. This complexity results both from the great variety
of wants and potentialities that each person possesses and from a basic
principle of human motivation that Rawls calls the "Aristotelian princi-
ple:"
25. RAWLS, supra note I § 46, at 303.
19731
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[O]ther things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities
(their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capac-
ity is realized, or the greater its complexity. The intuitive idea here is that human
beings take more pleasure in doing something as they become more proficient at
it, and of two activities they do equally well, they prefer the one calling on a larger
repertoire of more intricate and subtle discriminations. For example, chess is a
more complicated and subtle game than checkers, and algebra is more intricate
than elementary arithmetic. Thus the principle says that someone who can do both
generally prefers playing chess to playing checkers, and that he would rather study
algebra than arithmetic. . . .Presumably complex activities are more enjoyable
because they satisfy the desire for variety and novelty of experience, and leave room
for feats of ingenuity and invention. They also evoke the pleasures of anticipation
and surprise, and often the overall form of the activity, its structural development,
is fascinating and beautiful. Moreover, simpler activities exclude the possibility of
individual style and personal expression which complex activities permit and even
require, for how could everyone do them in the same way?"6
Not only is the individual good complex, but it can be analyzed and
planned rationally. It is "determined by the plan of life that we would
adopt with full deliberative rationality if the future were accurately
forseen and adequately realized in the imagination." 7 Happiness results
from the "successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life
drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions . . . Someone is
happy when his plans are going well, his more important aspirations
being fulfilled, and he feels sure that his good fortune will endure."2
Although the good differs among individuals, a rational life plan
will contain certain primary goods that are uniformly sought as rational.
Reasonable income and wealth, extensive liberty and opportunity, and
self-respect are primary goods that fit into any rational plan: self-respect
includes the individual's conviction that his goals in life are worth pursu-
ing and that he will be able to effect his purposes and intentions. 9
B. The Stability of Justice as Fairness
Before discussing the relationship between moral right, individual
good, and the question of stability, it is important to note that Rawls's
system, and the contract theory generally, emphasize the public nature
both of the principles of justice and the rules that flow therefrom and
also of the activity of officials. When a system publicly expresses men's
respect for each other, and society is known to operate justly, the per-
sons "subject to these arrangements tend to develop a desire to act in
accordance with these principles and to do their part in institutions
26. Id. § 65, at 426-27.
27. Id. § 64, at 421.
28. Id. § 63, at 409.
29. Id. § 67, at 440.
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which exemplify them. A conception of justice is stable when the public
recognition of its realization by the social system tends to bring about
the corresponding sense of justice."3 Whether Rawls's principles will
provide a stable system depends on whether the principles can reinforce
themselves in practice by generating a public sense of justice that will
regulate the life plans of individuals in a well-ordered society. Rawls
argues that justice as fairness is a stable concept because it is consistent
with sound psychological theory. It is in accord with the way people
come to hold and act upon moral principles, and is, therefore, a feasible
theory that can be put into practice.
Rawls believes that human nature is such that individual moral
development and the process of learning to act in a moral way comes
in three stages. As small children in the family we begin gradually to
acquire a sense of justice because our nature is such that we accept the
authority of our parents who impose certain precepts and conduct upon
us. Next, in the second stage our sense of justice is further developed
by approval and disapproval arising from association with others in
various groups in school, neighborhood, games and work where we
develop an awareness of other persons, their intentions, feelings and
point of view. We develop a set of emotional constraints, inhibitions and
reactions which are aroused by the success or failure to fulfill one's
duties and obligations in the association. The third stage completes our
moral development. We go beyond the approval and disapproval of
others as we analyze and understand the principles that operate in our
association with others. We develop moral principles, understand the
values they secure and the way they operate to everyone's advantage.
As we understand that we and those we care for are the beneficiaries of
just principles and institutions, we develop a desire to act upon ideals
and principles of justice, to work for just institutions, and to reform
existing ones when justice requires it. Rawls titles these three stages in
the maturing of the individual's sense of justice "the morality of
authority," "the morality of association," and "the morality of princi-
ples,' 3' and his treatment of them reflects his understanding of recent
developments in psychology and social behavior. 2
30. Id. § 29, at 177.
31. Id. §§ 70-72.
32. The influence of the social sciences on Rawls's thought is apparent in this statement of
the 3 stages of development:
First law: given that family institutions are just, and that the parents love the child and
manifestly express their love by caring for his good, then the child, recognizing their evident
love of him, comes to love them.
Second law: given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by acquiring
1973]
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Just as natural selection and the evolutionary process have shaped
man's physical and mental characteristics, these psychological tenden-
cies have forced man to develop a sense of justice that permits him to
operate within fair cooperative arrangements and stable social groups.
Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is consonant with these psychologi-
cal laws and the tendency of evolution because both are rooted in the
principle of reciprocity, mutuality, or partnership-the tendency to an-
swer in kind and return what is given.33
Reflecting the idea of reciprocity or mutual benefit, Rawls's con-
tract theory, his principles of equal liberty and equal opportunity, and
his difference principle combine the desires for protection and security
with altruism. This balance between altruism and self-interest guaran-
tees the development of the kind of sense of justice which the psychologi-
cal laws require for individuals to live in stable social groups. Rawls's
view that the benefits of social cooperation-liberty, opportunity, in-
come and wealth-should be distributed so as to be to everyone's advan-
tage gives effect to and heightens the operation of the reciprocity or
mutuality principle and is, therefore, a stable conception of justice.
Moreover, Rawls's two principles of justice and their subordinate
rules have greater clarity and a more definite structure than other con-
ceptions of justice. By contrast, utilitarianism vaguely and imprecisely
seeks to maximize the aggregate satisfaction. The clarity and order of
Rawls's principles "[offer his principles] with greater sharpness to the
intellect and thereby [secure] their hold on the mind, ' 34 thus increasing
the over-all stability of his system.
C. The Congruence of Justice as Fairness and Individual Good
Rawls also demonstrates that justice as fairness is congruent with
attachments in accordance with the first law, and given that a social arrangement is just and
publicly known by all to be just, then this person develops ties of friendly feeling and trust
toward others in the association as they with evident intention comply with their duties and
obligations, and live up to the ideals of their station.
Third law: given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by his forming
attachments in accordance with the first two laws, and given that a society's institutions are
just and are publicly known by all to be just, then this person acquires the corresponding sense
of justice as he recognizes that he and those for whom he cares are the beneficiaries of these
arrangements.
Id. § 75, at 490-91.
33. "Beings with a different psychology either have never existed or must soon have disap-
peared in the course of evolution. A capacity for a sense of justice built up by responses in kind
would appear to be a condition of human sociability. The most stable conceptions of justice are
presumably those for which the corresponding sense of justice is most firmly based on these
tendencies." Id. at 495.
34. Id. § 76, at 501.
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the conception of individual good as a rational life plan. The principles
of justice contribute to the individual good of the members of society
who, when they appraise their plans of life, "will decide to maintain
their sense of justice as regulative of their conduct toward one an-
other."35
In order to show the congruence of Rawlsian justice and individual
good, it is necessary to accept his idea of "social union" and understand
why individuals participate in groups. Rawls rejects the view that the
individual participates in families and other associations according to
the standard of reciprocity only as a means of obtaining a larger share
for himself and realizing his own private aims. Rawls contends that
people also participate because each person's individual "potentialities
. . . are greater than those he can hope to realize,"3 and, as dictated
by the Aristotelian Principle, the individual takes pleasure in the realiza-
tion of the potentialities of others and their efforts to develop and exer-
cise their abilities.
37
Social union in this sense of human sociability is desirable in itself.
Society is made up of many social unions, and Rawls conceives of a
society ordered according to the principles of justice as fairness as a
''social union of social unions" in which the members cooperate to
realize their own and other individuals' natures. Applying the idea of
social union to the basic structure of society as a whole, we find that
just institutions are good in themselves, and collective activity under
these principles must be experienced as a good in itself. The desire to
develop a sense of justice and act justly in the social union "derives in
part from the desire to express most fully what we are or can be, namely
free and equal rational beings with a liberty to choose.' 38 We most fully
realize our individual natures and our good when we act not only within
the various social unions to which we belong, but also act with a sense
of justice within the larger social union whose institutions are created
in accordance with the principles of justice as fairness.
Rawls's ordering of the first principle of justice over the sec-
ond-the priority he gives the principle of equal liberty over the princi-
35. Id. § 78, at 514,
36. Id. § 79, at 523,
37. "[I]t is through social union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members
that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of the others. We
are led to the notion of the community of humankind the members of which enjoy one another's
excellences and individuality elicited by free institutions, and they recognize the good of each as
an element in the complete activity the whole scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure
to all." Id.
38. Id. § 40. at 256.
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pie concerning the distribution of wealth and authority-proceeds from
the need of individuals to realize their own and other individuals' poten-
tialities through social union. This priority applies in relatively well-
ordered societies in which the level of abundance-food, clothing, and
material needs-is sufficient so that "only the less urgent wants remain
to be met by further advances. . . ."I' When basic material needs are
met, the individual commonly pursues spiritual and cultural interests,
participates in public affairs, and exercises some control over the laws
regulating association. The desire of individuals to express themselves
in free social union with others increases, and the importance of securing
the freedom of association in social unions through the principle of
equal liberty grows accordingly. Moreover, unless we emphasize the
prior importance of the self-respect arising from equal citizenship over
the status and self-esteem derived from an individual's place on the scale
of income and wealth, we elevate the importance of wealth and fix the
means of status in such a way that "each man's gain is another's loss."4
The nature of the relationship between principles of moral right and
the individual good, then, establishes justice as fairness as a more feasi-
ble conception than utilitarianism or other single-end philosophies.
Where utilitarianism pursues satisfaction or happiness as its dominant
end and maximizes this individual good for society at large to achieve
its principle of justice, justice as fairness reverses the order and recog-
nizes that the principles of right are realized prior to the good and
provide the parameters within which each person defines his own good.
Under this view the good is multiple and complex, and Rawls's theory
therefore does not aim at the "complete specification of conduct," as
do single- or dominant-end conceptions of justice.41 A person's conduct
is morally correct as long as he acts according to a rational life plan
regulated by the principles of justice as fairness.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL PROCESS
In our legal process, when private cooperative arrangements break
down or official action is questioned, the disputants generally seek "not
a change in the law but a declaration that existing law is in accordance
with their position,"42 and characteristically turn to the courts as the
place of first resort. As a result, the body of decisional law developed
by the courts with inputs from an infinite variety of sources constitutes
39. Id. § 82, at 542.
40. Id. at 545.
41. Id. § 86, at 566.
42. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 186 (1958).
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most of the enormous underlying body of law that governs society.
Legislatures usually make law "by way not of original solution of social
problems but by alteration of the solutions first laid down by courts.
' 4 3
Thus, the assumptions, forms of analysis, and constraints upon legal
development that lawyers and judges employ are very important in the
implementation of any social philosophy or policy.
Rawls's theory has many implications for the judicial process. In
the field of constitutional law, for example, much serious work is needed
to clarify and define the basis of various civil liberties. Rawls's theory
will be very helpful in determining the reach and limitations of principles
of constitutional adjudication. In An Anatomy of Values,4 Professor
Charles Fried has undertaken the process of clarifying various liberties
in relation to moral principles. His discussion of the relationship be-
tween justice as fairness and privacy, self-incrimination, and electronic
surveillance is a specific example of how analysis can reveal the relation-
ship between law and moral principles. Professor Fried defines the scope
of the right of privacy and the privileges against self-incrimination and
surveillance by demonstrating that privacy is the "rational context" in
which mutual respect, trust, friendship, and intimacy exist. 5 Rawls pro-
vides the rational structure to support similar analysis of other constitu-
tional principles.
Rawls's theory is also helpful in developing more rational princi-
ples and rules in the traditional areas of law like tort and restitution and
in modern fields which apply tort and restitutionary principles like se-
curities and antitrust regulation. Moreover, Rawls's theory provides a
new perspective on the instrumentalist view of law as a set of means
rather than ends, a perspective which alters the traditional view of the
nature of legal rights and duties. I want to explore briefly in this section
the implications of Rawls's theory in this more traditional area of con-
cern to the practitioner.
The dominant legal philosophy espoused by lawyers, judges, legal
scholars, and social scientists is an admixture of the utilitarian or posi-
tivist view of law expressed by John Austin" and the legal realism of
Justice Holmes. Rejecting the contract tradition of legal theory, this
philosophy suggests that law consists of both the commands and sanc-
tions imposed by officials and the principles and rules that can be de-
43. Id.
44. C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEM OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE
(1970).
45. Id. at 137-52.
46. J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R. Campbell ed. 1874).
19731
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
duced from their behavior. This view insists on separating law and
morals and on maintaining a sharp line between ethics or moral philoso-
phy and law. Developed in the nineteenth century in response to the
needs of an industrializing society, this philosophy offers a modern
theory of law with its roots in economic theory.
This is essentially an instrumentalist conception of law. Principles,
rules and procedures are simply tools to be manipulated so as to bring
about a rational order for society. They have no intrinsic value. This
conception of the legal system, which emphasizes the coercive element
of law and the need for predictable and regular administration of rules
and sanctions as a means of achieving a rational order, leaves out the
purposive and expressive nature of law and is therefore compatible with
injustice. Such an instrumentalist perspective fails to emphasize law as
a cooperative social activity consisting of ends of intrinsic value neces-
sarily giving expression to moral principles and judgments.
These principles of the instrumentalist philosophy are most appar-
ent in Justice Holmes's image of the "bad man:"
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for
wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the
practical importance of the distinction between morality and law. A man who cares
nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely
nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want
to keep out of jail if he can.
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him
to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
[I]f we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he did not care
two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what the
Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind.
The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law.47
This Darwinian or economic view is still at the basis of most thinking
about law. Two respected legal scholars, Calabresi and Melamed, have
recently reiterated it as follows:
Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more people,
or two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor. Absent such
a decision, access to goods, services, and life itself will be decided on the basis of
"might makes right"-whoever is stronger or shrewder will win. Hence the funda-
47. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-61 (1897).
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mental thing that law does is to decide which of the conflicting parties will be
entitled to prevail."
They explain their meaning in terms of Holmes's "bad man": "If Taney
owns a cabbage patch and Marshall, who is bigger, wants a cabbage,
he will get it unless the state intervenes."4 Accordingly, law is related
to morality but only, we might say, as the sickle and the pitchfork are
related to hay: "The use by the state of feelings of obligation and rules
of morality as means of enforcing most entitlements is not only crucial
but terribly efficient."5 They are separate but related tools used to cut
down and stack up in a more efficient way disorderly and arbitrary
natural forces.
In its emphasis on coercion, predictability, regularity, efficiency,
and order, the instrumentalist view focuses on one important aspect of
justice but not the most important one. It does not recognize that the
fundamental thing which law does is make concrete and real the mutual
ties and common purposes binding a society and express according to
the reciprocity principle the obligation of each individual to do his part
in advantageous cooperative ventures the benefits of which he accepts.
Rawls's theory intertwines-or, to use Holmes's word, "confuses"-law
and morals and emphasizes the expressive character, intrinsic value and
partnership or contractual quality of law. Under this conception we
should measure law not from the vantage point of the "bad man" but
from the less cynical perspective of the man in Rawls's original position
who retains his common sense and self-interest but does not give weight
to his own peculiar circumstances of wealth, social status, or race.
In some instances, analysis according to the reciprocity principle
will suggest new forms of legal argument and lead to conclusions differ-
ent from the instrumentalist position. In the absence of reciprocity, the
concept of a legal "duty" is quite weak. From the point of view of
Holmes's "bad man" it is weak, as it is in Professor Hohfeld's tradi-
tional cataloguing of legal relations in terms of rights, duties, powers,
and immunities.5 But the conception of a legal "obligation" arising
from the mutuality expressed in the reciprocity principle gives strength
and clarity to the concept of legal rights and duties.
The difference in the forms of analysis and outcome becomes
clearer when a specific example from tort law is considered. If a police
48. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
49. Id. at 1091.
50. Id. at 1090 n.4.
51. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONs 23-64 (W. Cook ed. 1923).
Professor Hohfeld is responsible for much of the classification of law employed today.
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officer shoots at a fleeing bank robber and mistakenly injures an inno-
cent bystander, analysis based on principles of utilitarianism and legal
realism could easily lead to a conclusion denying the liability of the
officer and the government. 2 Under utilitarian analysis, the issue in-
volved concerns the "reasonableness" of the police officer's risk-taking
conduct and questions whether the need to suppress crime by permitting
law enforcement officers to act without restraint in dangerous situations
justifies the risk that a stray bullet may injure a bystander. Using this
utilitarian calculus, which evaluates the maximum social utility by
weighing the social costs and benefits of capturing the felon by force,
some courts have found that the social benefits of suppressing crime do
justify injuring bystanders and that a reasonably prudent man would
undertake this risk in the name of law enforcement to promote the
general welfare, even though a few innocent individuals must suffer. 3
Even those courts holding otherwise often utilize the same pseudoscien-
tific cost-benefit reasoning. These courts add an insurance principle to
the cost analysis and conclude that since the general welfare requires
that society bear the cost of these injuries the state should be liable
because it is in the best position to spread the cost to society at large.54
Under justice as fairness and the reciprocity principle, however,
this utilitarian analysis is unacceptable because it fails to focus on the
legitimate expectations of the victim and on whether the existing cir-
52. In analyzing the case of the police officer who shoots a bystander, I follow the general
line of argument of Professor Gordon P. Fletcher in his Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). With unusual insight and mastery he traces the history of tort in the
19th century showing the departure of tort law from the principle of reciprocity to utilitarian theory
and instrumentalism.
53. See Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75 (1864); Shaw v. Lord, 41 Okla. 347, 137 P. 885 (1914).
54. See Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915), and cases cited therein. Using this
cost-benefit analysis, some courts, unfortunately, have continued to limit government liability, even
after the enactment in 1946 of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1970), a
measure designed to abolish absolute governmental immunity for the torts of its employees and to
broaden the government's liability for negligence. The Supreme Court, however, has construed the
Act to mean that policy decisions at high levels of government, as distinguished from decisions
made at the field or operational level, are immune from liability because the maximization of social
satisfaction requires that the injured individuals, rather than society, bear the cost of the govern-
ment's conduct. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 131
(4th ed. 1971). The justification of governmental immunity is almost always stated in positivist
terms following Justice Holmes's explanation in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353
(1907): "A sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Accord-
ingly, innocent individuals must remain uncompensated for injuries, even those caused by gross
negligence, simply because the negligent decision was made at the "policy" level. When FBI agents,
for example, negligently cause injury to passengers by shooting at a hijacked airplane, the question




cumstances surrounding the activity require that the party creating the
risk assume an obligation to restrict his activity in accordance with these
expectations. The reciprocity principle permits the creator of the risk
to expect the injured party to accept only the mutual or reciprocal risks
of a voluntary, cooperative endeavor, and not abnormal or nonrecipro-
cal risks. Thus the crucial question is whether the defendant created an
unequal risk-a risk that "was of an order different from the risks that
the plaintiff imposed on the defendant."5 If the risks are nonreciprocal,
the defendant is liable unless his conduct is excused, perhaps by compul-
sion, emergency, or unavoidable ignorance.
The reciprocity principle is concerned with doing justice between
the parties rather than maximizing community welfare through judicial
social engineering. For this reason, the reciprocity principle is more
congruent with traditional tort concepts of fault, negligence, contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of the risk, proximate cause and foreseea-
bility, and strict liability than is the cost-benefit analysis. The inquiry
in tort cases like the hypothetical situation is not how to aggregate
community satisfaction by cost-benefit analysis, but how to determine
the bounds of reciprocity and legitimate expectations. In the example,
the officer's conduct toward the victim is reckless because he knowingly
fires in the victim's direction, thus creating an abnormal or nonrecipro-
cal risk of harm that cannot be anticipated or guarded against. Since
there is no basis for excusing the dangerous conduct on grounds of
unavoidable ignorance, compulsion, or the foreseeability of the conse-
quences, justice as fairness would permit the victim to recover.
A Theory of Justice provides the main principles of a legal philoso-
phy that emphasizes fairness and cooperation and, when applied, is
likely to result in a more just approach by judges in their function as
the place of first resort for the resolution of disputes. Rawls has con-
structed a philosophy that takes the individual seriously and, unlike the
dominant utilitarian philosophy, does not attempt to conflate all per-
sons into one unit through the concept of maximizing community satis-
faction. Accordingly, Rawlsian philosophy makes it more difficult to
excuse arbitrary inequalities and violations of liberty.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL PROCESS
Combining ideas from various fields of learning and experience,
Rawls argues vigorously for a systematic social philosophy that articu-
lates the structure and unifies the direction of democratic liberalism.
55. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 546.
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Rawls provides a compelling and unifying social ethic, at least for those
who identify themselves with the forces of liberalism, but who have
heretofore only half-articulated the basis of their ideals. Rawls con-
structs the principles of a philosophy, but not the rules and standards
of legislation, judicial decision, or the idiom for a political campaign.
Like a work of art, this philosophy has a shape and beauty of its own,
but is not self-executing. Principles must be implemented to have useful-
ness and impact, for few people read philosophy; and even if they did,
principles alone "tell too little about what to do either to be effective in
getting it done or to make a penalty seem fair for not doing it." 6
The political implications of justice as fairness traverse the whole
spectrum of the political process and include the judgments required in
appointing federal judges, the consideration of legislation such as no-
fault insurance, the establishment of a realistic social minimum income
through welfare reform, the redistribution of benefits from work and
cooperation through major tax reform, the establishment of the liberty
of equal participation in the political process through public financing
of political campaigns, the modification of the antitrust laws to avoid
concentrations of economic power and to encourage the wider disbursal
of wealth, the alteration of wage and price controls-if they are to
continue-to limit corporate profit and capital gain as well as the work-
ing man's wage increases, the decision to enact a new public information
law opening official conduct to public disclosure, and the determination
to stop government wiretapping and other invasions of privacy. The
purpose of this Review, however, is not to deduce specific legislative
reform from Rawls's system, but to draw more general conclusions
about the political direction in which he leads. Perhaps this may best
be done by anticipating the likely nature of his opposition.
It will come on one hand from various conservative viewpoints that
defend and encourage widespread inequalities based upon inherited
wealth, position, and unequal natural abilities. On the other hand, oppo-
sition will come from Marxists, who argue that through class hatred and
revolution by the masses a classless society must be established in which
the means of production are owned by the state.-" Rawls constructs a
balance between these points of view, a balance which requires that
people redress arbitrary and widespread inequalities in society while
maintaining the principle of equal liberty and a framework of order in
which people can pursue their life plans as they choose.
56. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 42, at 160.
57. For an interesting criticism of Rawls from the perspective of the Marxist tradition see
McBride, Social Theory Sub Specie Aeternitatis: A New Perspective, 81 YALE L.J. 980 (1972).
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Conservatives will disagree with the egalitarian direction of justice
as fairness because they believe that the favored classes deserve in a
moral sense their wealth or inheritance, intelligence, energy and initia-
tive, and the resulting rewards of social position and authority. They will
focus on the question of deserving. Although some conservatives will
concede that major adjustments are necessary to eliminate invidious
discrimination and to allow the distribution of wealth and authority to
parallel more closely individual ability and merit, they will argue that
some individuals have greater moral worth than others, and that society
should recognize that inequalities based on individual merit are there-
fore valid and just.
The principle of equal liberty and the difference principles give
justice as fairness a more egalitarian political direction than the view
that men justly deserve the rewards of their natural ability. Rawls
argues that rewards based on natural ability are undeserved and should
remain unaltered only when their elimination would reduce the total
benefit to everyone, including the least favored. These "undeserved ine-
qualities," he says, "call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and
natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be some-
how compensated for." 8 His difference principle provides a method of
redress:
It transforms the aims of the basic structure so that the total scheme of institutions
no longer emphasizes social efficiency and technocratic values ...[and] repre-
sents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a
common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out
to be. Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from
their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost
out.51
Rawls allows greater incentives for those who use their abilities to
enlarge the stock of good for the mutual advantage of all. But while
Rawls and enlightened conservatives may agree on some social issues,
they will approach these issues in a very different manner. The conserva-
tive viewpoint, for instance, is hard to reconcile with the present federal
tax system that insists at least in theory that people pay progressively
higher proportions as their income rises and reflects, presumably, their
greater work and ability. Similarly, conservatism is difficult to square
with current social legislation that requires redress in the employment
of women or blacks even though their performance may not be so
"deserving." Justifying such social legislation under justice as fairness
is easily accomplished, but the conservative who sees these differences
58. RAWLS, supra note I, § 17, at 100.
59. Id. at 101.
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as morally-deserved can do so only with difficulty. For Rawls, equality
of opportunity means that people must reach for equality of results
rather than for opportunity for those who are naturally endowed.
From still another perspective, Marxists will argue that equality
requires the elimination of incentives and differences in reward-a class-
less society-and that this end can be effected only through political
revolution and class hatred. Rawls's answer is simply that a course of
revolution and hatred destroys the incentives and the framework of
cooperation which are to everyone's advantage, especially to the least
favored class.
Ultimately, Rawls's moral philosophy will have important meaning
for the political process because its particular emphasis on liberty,
equality, cooperation, and the claims of the least favored class seems
more consistent with basic Christian ethics than the principles of either
conservatism or Marxism. Justice as fairness balances in a more accept-
able way for post-industrial society the idea of rewarding work and
natural ability with the claims of the disadvantaged to individual moral
worth and dignity, and material assistance and opportunity. A Theory
of Justice will prove significant, finally, because it reflects an ancient
tradition whose roots are found in teachings millenia old:
When the Son of man shall come in his glory . . . [a]nd before him shall be
gathered all nations . . . [t]hen shall the King say unto them . . . [f]or I was
hungry and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger,
and ye took me in: Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was
in prison, and ye came unto me. Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, Lord,
when saw we thee hungry and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink? .... And
the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye
have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me. 0
60. Matthew 25:31-40.
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